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ROBUST DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
ABSTRACT: Deliberative democracy aspires to secure political liberty by making
citizens the authors of their laws. But how can it do this in the face of deep disagree-
ment, not to mention imperfect knowledge and limited altruism? Deliberative
democracy can secure political liberty by affording each citizen an equal position
as a co-author of public laws and norms. Moreover, fundamental deliberative
democracy—in which institutional design is ultimately accountable to public delib-
eration but not necessarily subject to its direct control—does not strain knowledge or
altruism. Thus, there is a place for deliberative democracy in a robust political
economy.
Keywords: deliberative democracy; incentive problems; knowledge problems; Mark Pennington;
spontaneous order.
What, morally speaking, is so great about deliberative democracy? Does it
offer moral beneﬁts that classical liberalism cannot match? And, if it does,
can it secure those beneﬁts even in the face of the incomplete knowledge
and limited altruism that characterize human social life?
In Robust Political Economy (Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar, ),
Mark Pennington takes up these questions with insight, detail, and rigor,
and the results of his analysis appear to be grim for deliberative democracy
(–). According to Pennington, the deliberative democratic project—
Daniel Layman, dalayman@davidson.edu, Department of Philosophy, Davidson College, P.O.
Box , Davidson NC , thanks Benjamin Bagley, Patrick Connolly, Luke Elson,
Jeffrey Friedman, Marija Jankovic, John Lawless, Sean McKeever, and Nathaniel Sharadin for
helpful discussion and comments on earlier drafts.
Critical Review (–): – ISSN - print, - online
©  Critical Review Foundation http://dx.doi.org/./..
or perhaps, by his lights, the deliberative democratic dream—stands no
chance against three damning problems. First, and most importantly, Pen-
nington argues that deliberative democracy has nothing of moral signiﬁ-
cance to offer that spontaneous market and social orders cannot offer more
efﬁciently (–). Let’s call this the moral inferiority problem with delibera-
tive democracy. Second, even if deliberative democracy could, in prin-
ciple, offer a more attractive moral proﬁle than spontaneous orders
alone, there is the knowledge problem: people, whether singly or in
groups, simply cannot acquire the knowledge about others, their needs,
and their preferences that would be necessary to make deliberative
democracy a success (–). Finally, there is the incentive problem: since
it is very unlikely that anyone’s vote or other deliberative contribution
will make a difference to what a society decides to do, no one has an
incentive to remedy her political ignorance or otherwise take her delib-
erative role seriously (–). Thus, even if deliberative democracy
could, in principle, be morally better than spontaneous order-based clas-
sical liberalism, any such arrangement would face two intractable practical
roadblocks grounded in human nature.
Pennington’s critique of deliberative democracy is just one strand of his
broader project, which is to show that only a classical liberal political
economy grounded in spontaneous order can secure a morally acceptable
society that is robust against our inevitably incomplete knowledge and
limited altruism. With the exception of one amendment, which I will
discuss in the penultimate section, I accept Pennington’s central robust-
ness thesis: if a model of political economy cannot solve both the knowl-
edge and incentive problems, we should reject it. I believe, however, that
deliberative democracy, properly construed, does meet the demands of
robustness while also offering moral beneﬁts that non-deliberative classical
liberalism cannot replicate. In particular, I will argue that deliberative
democracy alone can secure citizens against dependence on others’ per-
sonal wills by affording them a role as a coauthor of shared public
norms. Consequently, there is a good moral case for deliberative democ-
racy as the procedural foundation of a robust political-economic order.
I will proceed as follows. First, I will clarify the core features of delib-
erative democracy and classical liberalism and distinguish between what I
call the policy version and the fundamental version of each position.
Second, and most centrally to my argument here, I will argue that funda-
mental deliberative democracy is morally superior to fundamental classical
liberalism on the grounds that fundamental deliberative democracy can
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secure citizens’ independence from others’ personal wills, while funda-
mental classical liberalism cannot. Third, I will argue that fundamental
deliberative democracy is robust against the knowledge problem.
Fourth, I will argue that fundamental deliberative democracy is, with
some qualiﬁcations, robust against the incentives problem. I will conclude
with some remarks about how my argument lays the foundations for at
least a partial détente between classical liberalism and deliberative
democracy
Two Kinds of Deliberative Democracy (and Classical
Liberalism)
Following Pennington, I take classical liberalism to be fundamentally
committed to two core insights, each of which concerns one of the
two human frailties I mentioned in the introduction, and which a
robust political economy must accommodate (). The ﬁrst, which is
especially associated with Friedrich Hayek (), is that the range of
socially useful knowledge any person or organized group can acquire
and deploy is inevitably severely limited. People’s goals, preferences,
and interactions are far too complex to be objects of reliable centralized
knowledge. The second insight is that incentives are important (e.g.,
Ostrom ). In short: People cannot be expected to behave in a pro-
social way unless they stand to gain something by doing so. These two
insights together generate a commitment to spontaneous order as the
best means of structuring society and distributions within it. Pennington
helpfully deﬁnes spontaneous order:
“Orders” of this nature exhibit patterns of coordination, but the regularities
at issue are not the product of deliberate design by agents pursuing a unitary
goal. Rather, they are “emergent” phenomena that arise from a variety of
dispersed agents each pursuing their own separate ends. ()
Spontaneous orders satisfactorily address the knowledge problem
because they do not require any one agent to understand and respond
to circumstances beyond the scope of her own interactions. And such
orders observe the principle that incentives matter, because each of the
discrete actions from which spontaneous order emerges is chosen by an
individual agent pursuing her own goals. The classical liberal commitment
to spontaneous order grounds its familiar appreciation of markets. In a
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(primarily) market society, individuals have a solid institutional platform
on which to interact for mutual beneﬁt, leading to the efﬁcient communi-
cation of information through prices.
Let’s now consider deliberative democracy. Like all democratic pos-
itions, deliberative democracy holds that some extensive class of social
decisions should fall to the citizenry as a whole. But within democratic
theory, deliberative democracy stands in contrast with both elite democ-
racy and aggregative democracy. According to elite democracy, the
people cannot exercise, and should not attempt to exercise, anything
approaching direct control of anything. Following Joseph Schumpeter
(), elite democrats hold that a small cadre of political elites inevitably
shapes the beliefs and preferences of the people, so we should simply
subject these elites to minimal democratic checks. According to aggrega-
tive democracy, the democratic process aims at moving from diverse indi-
vidual preferences to optimal—which is to say, efﬁcient—collective
decisions (e.g., Arrow ). Deliberative democracy, by contrast, sees
the political process as one in which people do not attempt to instantiate
their pre-existing preferences in policy, but instead work with their fellow
citizens to reach sharable conclusions that reﬂect the reasons offered in the
deliberative process. Since deliberative democratic citizens are expected to
form and re-form their preferences as a result of the deliberative process
they share, we can say that each citizen’s position with respect to a
topic of deliberation is endogenous to that process. Furthermore, nearly
all versions of deliberative democracy impose a standard of public
reason on the considerations citizens may offer in the course of delibera-
tion. Perhaps most famously, Rawls (, –) argues that these con-
siderations must be justiﬁable on grounds acceptable to members of a
variety of distinct reasonable “comprehensive doctrines,” or worldviews,
that form an “overlapping consensus” on citizens’ status as free and equal
and on accompanying basic liberties.
So far I have sketched deliberative democracy and classical liberalism in
bare outline. I now want to address a crucial but underappreciated distinc-
tion between two forms that each of these views can take: the fundamen-
tal form and the policy form.
Policy deliberative democracy and policy classical liberalism are both
views about how particular institutions or dimensions of institutions
should operate. To endorse policy deliberative democracy about a par-
ticular good, service, or sector is to assert that a deliberating public
should directly control that good, service, or sector. Similarly, to
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endorse policy classical liberalism about a particular good, service, or
sector is to assert that spontaneous orders should directly control that
good, service, or sector. In contrast, fundamental deliberative democracy
and fundamental classical liberalism are views about the processes, groups,
or systems to which public policies are ultimately answerable. According to
fundamental deliberative democracy, public policy, whatever shape it
might take with respect to a particular good, service, or sector, is
subject to approval or rejection by citizens acting through an appropriately
structured democratic process. This does not mean that deliberating citi-
zens should exert direct control. But it does mean that questions of control
ultimately rest with the deliberative public. According to fundamental
classical liberalism, there should be no mechanism of social organization
or decision making more basic than spontaneous order. By fundamental
classical-liberal lights, spontaneous order is not just the best remedy for
democratic publics to employ to address particular problems. Rather,
the fundamental classical liberal denies that spontaneous order should
answer to collective decision-making at all. 
To further clarify the distinction between the policy and fundamental
forms of each view, it will be useful to consider an example. According to
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (, –), citizens should
make decisions about funding for cervical cancer tests by deliberating
about the merits of competing funding models. Consequently, we can
say that Gutmann and Thompson endorse policy deliberative democracy
about cervical cancer tests. In response, Pennington () endorses policy
classical liberalism with respect to cervical cancer tests. He argues that
instead of deliberating about how to fund cervical cancer testing, we
should allow a free market to determine test options and prices.
How do fundamental deliberative democracy and fundamental classical
liberalism relate to this case? Fundamental deliberative democracy per se
takes no stand on how to distribute cervical cancer tests. The deliberating
citizenry might, for instance, decide that it is in the public interest for
markets to dictate options and prices for such tests. If they were to do
so, their selective dose of classical liberalism would be entirely compatible
with a commitment to fundamental deliberative democracy. For proxi-
mate market control would then be licensed by, and accountable to, ulti-
mate public control. According to fundamental classical liberalism, by
contrast, spontaneous order should dictate the price and availability of
cancer tests because (a) this is the mode of control that emerges from spon-
taneous order, thereby solving the knowledge and incentives problems;
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and (b) societies should employ no mechanism of ultimate decision-
making or accountability more basic than spontaneous order. Fundamen-
tal deliberative democracy and fundamental classical liberalism might
therefore render the same policy recommendations in some cases, albeit
for different (ultimate) reasons.
My aim in this essay is to defend fundamental deliberative democracy
against the three charges Pennington levels against deliberative democ-
racy, which he appears to understand exclusively in its policy form. I
will not, however, undertake to defend policy deliberative democracy
in any sector. Whether deliberative groups should choose further delib-
eration or spontaneous order in particular cases is a highly complicated
and empirically dependent question that I am not equipped to answer.
But whether citizens should serve together as authoritative arbiters of pol-
itical and economic institutions is a question of political morality to which
a philosopher can reasonably hope to contribute. Unless otherwise noted,
everything I say in defense of deliberative democracy should be under-
stood to pertain only to fundamental deliberative democracy, not to
policy deliberative democracy. And unless otherwise noted, all criticism
of classical liberalism is criticism of fundamental classical liberalism, not
policy classical liberalism.
The Moral Case for Fundamental Deliberative Democracy
According to Pennington, the central moral case for deliberative democ-
racy is Iris Marion Young’s argument in Justice and the Politics of Difference
(), which turns on deliberative democracy’s purportedly unique
power to give minorities an effective voice. Pennington characterizes
her case for deliberative democracy as follows:
The central moral argument for deliberative democracy is that it is more
likely to reﬂect ethical norms of justice than bargaining in markets or
market-like structures because it enables members of “excluded” groups
including the poor and various cultural minorities to have their views regis-
tered in a public forum and to be heard with respect. ()
Pennington then argues that in fact, markets promote minority voices
more effectively than deliberation. Whereas it is unlikely that a parliamen-
tary representative can adequately capture and express each individual’s
values and preferences, everyone can present her own values and
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preferences effectively and accurately through mutually beneﬁcial private
transactions (). Moreover, they can do so regardless of their relative skill
(or perceived skill) as persuasive writers or speakers (–).
These considerations are highly suggestive, and they might even be
correct. Nevertheless, I will not engage them here, because—contrary
to Young—I do not think that deliberative democracy’s principle moral
virtue is its promotion of minority voices. To the contrary, deliberative
democracy’s principle moral virtue is its capacity to secure citizens’
liberty from others’ personal power.
Political liberty is a highly complex good that encompasses many
dimensions. Contrary to theorists who insist on a single, univocal under-
standing of liberty, I am happy to allow that along several dimensions,
freedom worth caring about is both positive (freedom to) and negative
(freedom from).
One important dimension of freedom, which has received recognition
from authors as different as Hayek and Rousseau, is independent status.
Someone who enjoys independent status does not have to depend on
others’ personal wills in order to enjoy important social goods or to
occupy important social roles. Yet someone who lacks this dimension
of liberty might nonetheless enjoy a great deal of unobstructed choice.
Consider the famous example of the favorite slave. Such a slave
might receive a great deal of money and inﬂuence from her master, who
might demand little or nothing from her. But she nonetheless enjoys
these goods (and indeed all other goods) at the discretion of her master.
She enjoys freedom as non-interference, and perhaps other dimensions
of liberty as well, but she does not enjoy freedom as independent status.
The moral intuition underlying the signiﬁcance of independent status
is reﬂected in the ancient maxim that a free person must be ruled by laws
rather than by men. In every society, people must, in a variety of senses, be
subject to others’ judgments. Those of us attracted to freedom as indepen-
dent status seek neither to deny this fact nor to achieve some kind of ato-
mistic way of life that affords each person absolute independence. This
dimension of freedom is, as Philip Pettit (, ) puts it, a “freedom
of the city,” not a “freedom of the heath.” But according to the ideal
of independent status, subjection to others’ judgments must never be sub-
jection to their judgments simply as such. Rather, to the extent that I
depend on others’ judgments for important goods, their judgments
must be constrained by a set of rules or norms that are answerable and jus-
tiﬁable to everyone, not just to those wielding power.
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Adam Smith and others following him have argued that free markets
liberate people from the kind of personal dependence present in feudal
and slave societies. Whereas a serf has a particular lord to whom she
must answer, a worker may choose among prospective employers inter-
ested in purchasing her services. She may exit a particular employment
relationship if she judges that is in her best interests to do so; and to
the extent that she has a great deal to offer employers, they will be
incentivized to compete with one another by offering her increasingly
favorable terms. Thus, rigorously competitive markets are, according to
this line of thought, an excellent (perhaps the best) remedy for dependent
status.
It is certainly true that in a rigorously competitive market order, no one
depends entirely on any one agent’s will. For this reason, Smith was right
to praise the fall of feudalism and rise of markets as a victory for liberty.
However, the difference in personal dependence between a society fun-
damentally governed by feudal norms and one fundamentally governed
by market norms is one of degree, not one of kind. For even when
uneven power is highly dispersed within a market, it can still violate inde-
pendent status, albeit to a lesser extent than in a system wherein individ-
uals are subject to a single, identiﬁable master. Consequently, fundamental
classical liberalism, in which spontaneous orders are the ultimate arbiters of
institutional structure, is fully compatible with (attenuated) violations of
independent status.
In order to better understand this point, it will be useful to introduce
the idea of shared control. As I mentioned above, freedom as independent
status requires that personal judgment regarding others’ important oppor-
tunities be constrained by norms and rules responsive to all. Pettit has
suggested—rightly, I think—that we should unpack this idea in terms
of control. To borrow an example from him: I may, compatibly with
my freedom from personal power, give a friend temporary control over
my liquor cabinet in order to cut back on my drinking (Pettit ,
). My friend has power over my choice, but only at my behest and
on my terms, and at the pre-appointed time it will be up to me
whether to continue his power or cut it off. Since my friend’s power ulti-
mately reﬂects my will rather than his, it is not merely a reﬂection of his
personal judgment and, consequently, it does not infringe my liberty,
understood as independence.
Now, it might seem that this understanding of liberty from personal
power makes freedom in democratic society—or indeed any society—
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strictly impossible, and thereby pushes the independence theorist out of
the city and onto the heath. After all, no one’s will can personally
control the operations of the state, so it might seem that no one can be
free in a state. But deliberative democracy offers not separate control
for each person, but rather co-authorship of a single, ongoing, collective
act of control, wherein the controller is the people rather than any person
or subgroup. We can be free from personal power in deliberative
democracy because we are free to contribute, as equal coauthors, to the
fundamental norms and decisions that structure society’s institutions.
Before proceeding with my account of how deliberative democracy
can secure independent status, a clariﬁcation is in order. For my purposes,
there is no need to endorse independent status as some kind of ultimate,
trumping, or even lexically prior social good. To the contrary, one need
only accept the claim—which I don’t take to be very controversial—that
independent status is a moral good worth having, even if other moral
goods in society are more valuable. My aim in this paper is to show
that we can have independent status through deliberative democracy
without paying the kind of epistemic and motivational costs that worry
classical liberals such as Pennington. Consequently, we need only make
the modest assumption, shared by nearly everyone in the liberal tradition,
that independent status is a good worth caring about to some non-trivial
degree.
Let’s return now to my description of the collective action of the
democratic people as coauthorship. This is not idle metaphor. To the con-
trary, I believe that the distinctive logic of coauthorship, within which a
group of people composes one and the same text, also characterizes delib-
erative democracy and affords it its liberating power. The control we share
as democratic citizens is much more analogous to a group of people
writing a book together than it is to each member of some plurality sub-
mitting inputs to a machine or exerting pressure on a physical object.
Shared democratic control is not a matter of everyone submitting her
own inputs or pressures to a system that manages them and renders a
single outcome. Rather, it is a matter of everyone thinking about each
input together, in light of the structure and aims of the whole process.
Consider textual coauthorship more closely. When some group of
people authors a text together, their aim is to express, in one voice, a
single coherent vision and line of argument. Moreover, what counts as
a successful suggestion by one of the co-authors is largely endogenous
to the ongoing activity she shares with the other coauthors. Its quality
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depends on the ongoing conceptualization of the project that is continu-
ally being produced by deliberation among the coauthors in light of their
previous decisions. If someone agrees to coauthor a document with some
others but then shows up at the writing session with a list of contents she
wants in the ﬁnal product, regardless of the process of creation in conjunc-
tion with the others, we would say that she is not really willing to be a
coauthor at all. Rather, she wants to author her own ideas, using the
writing process as a vehicle for them. True coauthorship is thus control
of the creation of a text that is irreducibly collective. It is not control
by any one author, nor is it each author’s individual control aggregated
into some kind of additive heap, as would be the case if each author
wrote her bit separately and then tried to negotiate its inclusion. Each
of the authors takes part in one and the same process of control, and for
this reason, she may—and indeed should—lay claim, equally with the
others, to the entire text.
As I understand and defend deliberative democracy, it is the ongoing
coauthorship, by all of the citizens together, of decisions about fundamen-
tal norms and institutional structures that govern shared social life. Each
citizen shares equally in one and the same process of control over what
they will do, say, and allow as a people. Consequently, it is right to say
that each person stands in a control relation to the power operative in
the democratic process as a whole, and that she is the author of the
democracy’s outputs. Just as every sentence of a genuinely coauthored
text is jointly attributable to each coauthor, each decision of a genuinely
deliberative democracy is jointly attributable to each citizen.
We are now in a position to see why fundamental classical liberalism
cannot free citizens from arbitrary power, whereas fundamental delibera-
tive democracy can. Even if power in a market society is highly dispersed
and impersonal, the institutional options and costs that result from that
power are not equally attributable to each member of that society.
Rather, they are more attributable to those with greater economic stand-
ing. This is not, of course, to say that an individual or group exercises sole,
personal discretion in the way that a lord might in a feudal society. It is
merely to say that since some people’s decisions count for much more
than others’, the opportunities and costs faced by participants are more
attributable to some than to others. Consequently, there is no coauthor-
ship of power structures in place, and the better off exercise power over
the worse off. This power, though in a real sense constrained by market
pressures, is not accountable to the reasons and concerns offered by those
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subject to it. Fundamental deliberative democracy, by contrast, renders all
power accountable to the single shared control of a community of equal
coauthors to whom the resulting norms and policies are wholly attribu-
table. The whole democratic output of law and policy is attributable to
each citizen-coauthor in just the way that a whole text is attributable to
each of its literal coauthors.
Before moving on, I want to distinguish my claim in this section from
two other, closely related claims. First, I am not claiming that the capitalist
class forms some kind of agent or quasi-agent. Unless the economically
well off engage in anti-competitive collusion, which I am not here assum-
ing, there is no reason to suppose that “the capitalists” en masse possess a
will on which anyone is dependent. The wills on which people in spon-
taneous market orders are dependent are, instead, simply those of individ-
uals and ﬁrms. Second, I am not claiming that relatively better-off
members of a spontaneous economic order intentionally plan and carry
out actions with the aim of supporting that order and their positions in
it. Economic actors, including powerful ones, usually pursue their
plans and projects without thinking at all about the larger order within
which they operate, much less intentionally aiming to preserve it. My
point is not that anyone intentionally maintains the economic system,
but rather that some people within a fundamentally spontaneous order
exert disproportionate inﬂuence within it, thereby rendering others’
options asymmetrically dependent on their wills and preferences.
Objections and Replies
In this section, I will consider ﬁve possible objections to the moral defense
of fundamental deliberative democracy I have been developing. Once we
have dealt with these, we will be in a position to assess whether and how
fundamental deliberative democracy can deliver its moral goods without
falling afoul of the knowledge problem or the incentive problem.
First: how can democracy be at once deliberative in the way I have
been describing and representative, as any large-scale democracy certainly
must be?
While this problem is no doubt serious, I see no reason to think it
intractable. One feasible step that would signiﬁcantly increase the delib-
erative character of representative democracy would be to limit campaign
activities to formal arguments and policy proposals offered in a standar-
dized format using a standard, publicly approved budget. Another
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would be to replace individual votes for national ofﬁce with local votes
determined by direct deliberation at the local level. Still another would
be to open public decisions to more avenues of public contestation.
None of this amounts to anything like a concrete proposal. But all we
need in the present context is reasonable hope that there are no insur-
mountable barriers to such a proposal’s being given. And in light of
these considerations and myriad others on offer in the democracy litera-
ture, it seems to me that there are grounds for such reasonable hope.
The second objection derives from some remarks Jason Brennan offers
about the purported connection between democracy and autonomy.
Brennan writes:
If there is a connection between voting and autonomy, it must be some-
thing like this: by voting, a person is in part the author of the laws. . . .
Notice, however, that voting confers autonomy only if your side wins.
(Brennan , )
Brennan seems to reason that one governs oneself through the demo-
cratic process only insofar as one succeeds in using it to effect one’s own
preferences. This criticism relies on an aggregative conception of democ-
racy, wherein people aim to secure through democratic machinery the
exogenous preferences they bring with them to the democratic process.
I am happy to grant that democratic autonomy is a prize for ideological
winners if we understand democracy and its emancipatory potential in
terms of aggregation. But I have been arguing that this is the wrong
way to understand democracy and its emancipatory potential. In the delib-
erative picture I have articulated here, each deliberative citizen shares in
one and the same coauthorship of shared norms. If coauthors of a text dis-
agree on the direction in which a chapter ought to proceed, we do not
attribute the resulting chapter only to those coauthors who supported
the direction chosen. To the contrary, the text as a whole is equally attribu-
table to all of the coauthors, because we take the coauthors to be engaged
in an irreducibly collective and shared process of assessing reasons in order
to express a single system of ideas. By the same token, deliberative decisions
are jointly attributable to each member of the deliberative body, which is
likewise engaged in an irreducibly collective and shared process of assessing
reasons in order to express a single system of ideas.
The third objection comes from Pennington himself. He writes: “Pro-
cedures that rely on the statement of explicit reasons are more likely to
exclude systematically those individuals who are less able to engage in
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the articulate persuasion of majorities” (). Does deliberative democracy
simply substitute a complex hierarchical structure of persuasive power for
classical liberals’ hierarchical structure of economic power?
I think not. For under deliberative democracy, it doesn’t matter which
deliberative citizens introduce the suggestions that ﬁnally win out, as long
as those proposals are ones that each citizen can endorse as products of the
deliberative procedure in which she shares.
Suppose that citizens are debating whether the state should manage the
cost of education directly, or instead let supply and demand for edu-
cational goods establish prices for those goods. One citizen ﬁnds herself
with a very clear set of reasons to believe that markets in education are
best, while another ﬁnds herself in a general muddle about the whole
topic. The former citizen presents her reasons to the latter citizen, who
is then able to reﬂect and judge that she can accept those reasons, even
though she could not have expressed them herself. In this scenario, one
person is a much stronger and more conﬁdent participant in the process
of deliberative democracy than another. But since this process is, essen-
tially, one characterized by the shared aim of discovering jointly justiﬁable
reasons, this is no problem for equality within it. Just as each coauthor of a
text is the author of the whole text, including parts with respect to which
another author was a much stronger contributor than she, public norms
are attributable to each deliberative citizen, including those who are rela-
tively unable to produce reasons bearing on questions at hand.
Although it is not a problem for deliberative democracy and its eman-
cipatory potential for some people to attain a better track record than
others when it comes to producing reasons that survive deliberation, it
would be a problem if only a few elites could understand and rationally
afﬁrm the community’s decisions. If the argumentative skills that tend
to shepherd proposals through deliberation in a given polity are simply
those of bamboozling others, then deliberative democracy isn’t worth
much. But as I noted earlier, the constraints of public reason—which
aim to secure deliberation and outcomes that are sharable from a public
point of view—are part of the structure of the deliberative democratic
picture. Thus, a “deliberative” system pushed around by a few smooth-
talking bullies or charlatans isn’t really a system of deliberative democracy
at all.
The fourth objection is that there can be no objectionable status
dependence under fundamental classical liberalism because social and
economic power is ﬂuid. No one is assigned the position of a worker
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or a boss, for instance, and individuals and families can and do move up
(and down) according to the success (or failure) of their efforts. Power
and status within spontaneous order is mutable and contingent, not
static and socially mandated. It certainly is true that there is more mobility
of power and position within competitive spontaneous orders than within
pre-capitalist orders, and this fact is much to the credit of competitive
spontaneous orders. However, the success that supports mobility (and
the failure that holds it back) is not straightforwardly within any individ-
ual’s power. Myriad factors form a system of massive complexity that
determines, to a considerable extent, how easy or difﬁcult it will be for
various individuals to succeed. No one person or group of people is
responsible for the fact that a billionaire is better positioned for power
in a market order than a pauper. Nevertheless, the billionaire is better
positioned, and those who are well positioned bear a disproportionately
powerful degree of inﬂuence on even the most faceless and complex
spontaneous order.
The ﬁfth and ﬁnal challenge worth considering here is this: even if
deliberative democracy does secure freedom as independent status more
effectively than classical liberalism, classical liberalism secures freedom as
agency more effectively than deliberative democracy. Although delib-
erative democracy can render us free from asymmetrical dependence,
only classical liberalism can afford us the space and choice to pursue our
own projects in our own ways.
This criticism fails, for two reasons. First, the degree to which a person
enjoys space to pursue her own preferences in her own way within a com-
petitive spontaneous order depends, to a considerable extent, on her pos-
ition within that order. If I am very poor and work eighty-hour weeks to
survive, I might enjoy almost no such space at all. The fact that I might in
principle rise to a better station in no way counts against the fact that the
space of my agency is, at present, very severely constrained. Moreover, it is
no use to point out that I am legally permitted to do more than I am in fact
able to do, or that I could do more if I were able to incentivize others to
go along with my preferences. If the issue at hand is space for free agency,
it must be the extent of a person’s actual action space that matters, not the
extent of action space she would be permitted to enjoy if she did better in
the market.
Second, even if we grant that market institutions are uniquely suited to
facilitate individual agency, this counts in favor of policy classical liberalism
but not fundamental classical liberalism. Suppose I judge that an acceptable
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level of individual agency is possible only when public institutions have
extensive classical liberal features. This is a reason for me to defend exten-
sively classical liberal institutions to my fellow citizens. For instance, it
would be a reason for me to argue against policies that would give the
state either a controlling stake in ﬁrms or the power to levy heavy taxes
on entrepreneurial activity. It would not, however, be a reason for me
to object to the requirement that I present and justify my view to my
fellow citizens. And it is this latter requirement that is insisted upon by
fundamental—rather than policy—deliberative democracy.
Deliberative Democracy and the Knowledge Problem
I have now sketched and defended what I take to be the primary moral
case for fundamental deliberative democracy over fundamental classical
liberalism: only fundamental deliberative democracy can secure indepen-
dent status for all citizens. We now need to consider the knowledge
problem and the incentive problem. If deliberative democracy makes
unworkable demands on citizens’ epistemic capacities, or if there is no
reason to believe that morally ordinary people can be motivated to take
deliberative democracy seriously, deliberative democracy will be unten-
able regardless of its moral merits. In the next two sections, I will take
up these objections in turn, starting with the knowledge problem.
Recall the knowledge problem: the knowledge people would need to
possess in order effectively to establish and pursue collective social goals is
too complicated for any deliberative process to capture. This knowledge
problem is both genuine and important, although I am unsure whether it
is as severe as many classical liberals would have us believe. But even if we
accept that social knowledge is as troublesome as classical liberals argue
that it is, democratic polities are epistemically capable of securing the
moral beneﬁts I described in the previous section. This is true because
deliberative democratic polities can accomplish the following two tasks,
even if we assume the knowledge problem applies in its strongest form.
First, they can deﬁne the appropriate moral parameters within which
acceptable policy must operate. Second, democratic citizens can recog-
nize, and express to one another, the limits of their explicit knowledge
and deploy markets or other spontaneous orders to compensate for
those limits. For fundamental deliberative democracy does not entail
deliberative control at the policy level.
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Let’s take to the case of medical coverage. Suppose that a democratic
polity is faced with the question of whether and how to fund medical
care for its members. The medical market is undeniably complicated, as
indeed it must be in order to serve the diverse medical needs of the com-
munity. Consequently, it is highly unlikely that any single individual
could plan and operate that market, let alone that a diverse and untrained
group of citizens could do so. Nevertheless, a diverse and untrained group
of citizens can understand, in general terms, what it would mean for the
medical system to respect core norms of liberal political morality, such as
fairness and equal respect.
Consider how a debate about medical policy in such moral-political
terms might proceed. Citizen A argues that it is improper for the state
to fund medical coverage, because this inappropriately treats citizens as
dependent children rather than as independent adults. In order to
respect citizens as independent adults, she argues, we must not publicly
fund health care. In response, citizen B invokes the same liberal value
of equal independence in support of the contrary position. According
to B, if we are to respect all citizens as independent equals, we must
not allow anyone to become dependent on the vicissitudes of the
market in order to secure her physical health. Pursuing this disagreement
through a deliberative process does require a certain kind of knowledge,
namely basic acquaintance with the core concepts that deﬁne liberal citi-
zenship. It also requires the practical wisdom to frame and assess, on their
moral merits, arguments offered within that framework. These, however,
are not the sorts of knowledge to which the knowledge problem is sup-
posed to apply. The knowledge problem afﬂicts attempts to connect a
diverse and ﬂuid set of personal goals and preferences with efﬁcient sol-
utions, not debates about the implications of shared moral concepts.
Now suppose that A and B’s community has decided that the state
must provide health-care support to all citizens. This raises the question
of how exactly it ought to do so. Some possible approaches can be
addressed, and perhaps ruled out, on moral grounds alone. For instance,
the people might rule out any funding mechanism that would run afoul
of the liberty to choose one’s own profession. But once such unacceptable
options have been ruled out, there will likely remain a number of broadly
permissible approaches among which the community will have to decide.
My second point concerning the knowledge problem naturally arises
here: If the deliberative public lacks the knowledge to solve some
problem deliberatively, it can and should endorse a non-deliberative
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approach to solving it. This might mean delegating the matter to experts,
but in many cases, it might mean turning to a free market. For example,
the public might decide that the best health-care option in light of its epis-
temic limits is a richly funded voucher system together with a marketplace
of commercial hospitals, insurance ﬁrms, and pharmaceutical companies.
This kind of move is, to be sure, incompatible with policy deliberative
democracy in the arena of medicine. But it is not in conﬂict with funda-
mental deliberative democracy, which is the only form of deliberative
democracy I am defending here.
One might grant this point but turn instead to incentives: Even if citi-
zens can identify knowledge problems and, when appropriate, use
markets in order to proceed in light of them, will they really be sufﬁciently
incentivized to do so? Won’t they attempt instead to seize the political
process to further their personal aims, knowledge problems notwithstand-
ing? This objection strikes me as just one speciﬁcation the general incen-
tive challenge to deliberative democracy. So let’s turn to that challenge
now.
Deliberative Democracy and the Incentive Problem
Recall Pennington’s incentive problem for deliberative democracy: Since
it is very unlikely that any individual will be able to effect any particular
outcome by democratic means, individuals lack a sufﬁcient incentive to
take democracy seriously. They will be rationally ignorant of political
affairs, and they will be disinclined to devote time, energy, and resources
to the political process. It is true that it is highly unlikely that an individual
will cast a vote that will determine whether her preference carries the day.
Moreover, although the odds of effecting one’s pre-deliberative prefer-
ences through a process of collective deliberation may (or may not) be
slightly better than those offered by voting alone, such odds are far
from a sure bet. Thus, if we insist that the only incentives that can motiv-
ate citizens are incentives grounded in the likelihood of securing their
pre-deliberative preferences, deliberative democracy does not provide
adequate incentives for citizens to take it seriously.
However, insisting on this point is hardly fair to the deliberative demo-
crat. For the opportunity to effect pre-deliberative preferences is not what
deliberative democracy purports to offer. Rather, it purports to offer the
opportunity to share equally in the process of authoring the norms and
institutions by which one will be bound along with others and,
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thereby, the opportunity to achieve freedom as independent status. Delib-
erative democracy does not ask citizens to put aside what is good for them
or to sacriﬁce themselves for others. If it did, it would surely be untenable.
Instead, it asks people to conceptualize their good as centrally depending
on freedom from slavish dependence on others’ personal wills. If someone
genuinely does not care about suffering such dependence, it is not clear
why she would be motivated to care about deliberative democracy.
I have been claiming all along that I mean to ﬁnd a place for delibera-
tive democracy within a robust political economy. But have I compro-
mised this aim by granting that those who don’t care about their own
domination lack an effective incentive to take seriously their roles as
democratic citizens? I have not. According to the robustness thesis, an
adequate political economy secures important goods for all even when
people are widely ignorant and imperfectly altruistic. Pennington does
not offer an explicit statement about what goods count as important for
the purpose of assessing the robustness of political economies. But the
examples of such goods that he does offer—which include health, edu-
cation, wealth, and environmental protection—suggest that he has in
mind goods that everyone has reason to value, whatever else they
might value (). We can follow Rawls in calling such goods primary
goods. According to Rawls, primary goods include not just morally
neutral goods such as wealth and health, whose value is independent of
moral commitments, but also irreducibly moral goods, such as the social
bases of self-respect. The value of irreducibly moral primary goods
depends on moral commitments that individuals reasonably ought to
have, such as a commitment to seeing themselves as worthy of equal
status and respect. It is not clear whether Pennington means to endorse
irreducibly moral primary goods along with morally neutral primary
goods. But my moral case for deliberative democracy depends on accept-
ing at least one irreducibly moral primary good: independent status. This
good is irreducibly moral because it is only important to those who value
as morally signiﬁcant their independence from others’ unaccountable
power. If someone does not judge that this dimension of her relationships
with others is morally signiﬁcant, she is unlikely to value her independent
status.
Now, it is true of all social goods that, ceteris paribus, more robust pro-
tection is better than less robust protection. But once we allow that some
irreducibly moral goods are among the primary goods, we may need to
relax, if only slightly, the degree of robustness we demand of our political
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economy. For although we can rely on people to care about morally
neutral primary goods no matter what else they might care about, the
same cannot be said for irreducibly moral primary goods. If someone
simply doesn’t care about her social position, she won’t be incentivized
to take steps to secure it. Consequently, we are faced with a choice. On
the one hand, we might opt for a sparse lineup of primary goods that
excludes irreducibly moral goods. If we do so, we can demand robustness
of the utmost rigor against the stubborn fact that incentives matter. For if
the primary goods to be secured include only those that every instrumen-
tally rational person has an incentive to pursue, incentive problems could,
in principle, be limited to those very few individuals who are instrumen-
tally irrational. On the other hand, we might include independent status,
which is irreducibly moral, among the primary goods. If we do so, we
must relax somewhat the standard of acceptable robustness, at least
when it comes to incentives. For we must grant that there might be instru-
mentally rational people who nonetheless don’t value themselves enough
to care about their independent status. Consequently, if we count inde-
pendent status as a primary good and structure our political institutions
accordingly, we risk a slightly higher rate of incentive problems than if
we counted only non-moral goods as primary goods. That is, a political
economy that includes as primary such irreducibly moral goods as inde-
pendent status is slightly less robust—which is to say, it secures its speciﬁed
goods under slightly more constrained circumstances—than a political
economy that countenances only morally neutral primary goods.
Does the need to trade off some small degree of robustness for inde-
pendent status pose a serious problem for fundamental deliberative
democracy? It would pose a serious problem if robustness per se were lexi-
cally prior to all other social goods. But robustness is only as important as
the goods it robustly secures. If independent status is morally signiﬁcant to
even a moderate degree, we should be willing to accept some small
reduction in the robustness of our political and economic system in
order to protect independent status therein. And for reasons I have
been exploring in this essay, there is good reason to believe that indepen-
dent status is at least moderately morally signiﬁcant, if not more so. Thus,
unless there is some political system that secures independent status just as
well as deliberative democracy while also motivating absolutely every
instrumentally rational person to take seriously her role in the system,
the slight reduction in robustness that comes with deliberative democracy
is well worth the moral payoff it offers.
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Someone might press further still: Doesn’t empirical evidence over-
whelmingly suggest that people largely choose to remain politically ignor-
ant, eschew voting, and otherwise disregard their roles as citizens? It
certainly does. But few contemporary democratic polities are even
remotely deliberative in their structure. Many people see the extant pol-
itical process—not entirely unreasonably—as little more than a rigged
machine over which the distant powerful squabble for their own pur-
poses. They rightly identify little correlation between showing up at the
polls and their own emancipation. My claim here is not that extant demo-
cratic institutions secure independent status while respecting the limits of
knowledge and altruism. Rather, it is that fundamental deliberative
democracy, which does not actually exist, could secure independent
status within these limits. While there are no doubt many obstacles
between us and a political future characterized by fundamental delibera-
tive democracy, the epistemic and motivational limitations of human
beings per se are not among them.
* * *
Under the inﬂuence of Hayek, classical liberals have taken deliberative
democracy to be paradigmatically at odds with their most important
insights. Indeed, an aggressively deliberative approach to public justiﬁca-
tion has struck most classical liberal theorists as manifesting a reckless,
devil-may-care attitude toward social reality and human limitations.
Moreover, as Pennington articulates so clearly, the deliberative democrat
seems to indulge in this risk-seeking behavior in vain, since all of the
moral payoffs she seeks are available, risk free, from spontaneous order.
I have tried to show the way towards a kind of peace between classical
deliberative democracy and classical liberalism. Deliberative democracy,
at least in its fundamental form, is uniquely capable of securing our
freedom while still heeding the classical liberal warning that has rung
out since the Scottish enlightenment: we must never commit our
merely human lives to a system built for creatures smarter and saintlier
than we can ever hope to become.
NOTES
. It is important to distinguish the classical liberalism under discussion here from
libertarianism as a system of political morality. According to libertarian political
morality, individuals hold very strong natural property rights that render most
government intrusion immoral. While classical liberals may endorse libertarian
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political morality (and some do), they need not do so, and I will not assume that
they do. In particular, I do not mean to attribute any such political morality to
Pennington. For a treatment (but not an endorsement) of libertarian political
morality, see Brennan and Jaworski , -.
. The literature on deliberative democracy is enormous and highly various. Two
important strands of contemporary deliberative democratic thought are grounded
in the work of Jürgen Habermas () and John Rawls (). While Habermas
takes a critical-theory approach that emphasizes the need to free communication
from the grips of ideology through rational discourse, Rawls emphasizes delibera-
tion as way for citizens to arrive, through the exchange of publicly valid reasons, at
institutions justiﬁable to all.
. Pennington seems to endorse a version of wide classical liberalism insofar as he
urges that even political entities should emerge from, and remain subject to, spon-
taneous competition with one another: “The state . . . although a particularly
powerful organization should be just one of many other similar organizations,
constrained in its powers by the existence of competitors” ().
. Readers will recognize the idea of freedom from personal power as one central to
recent “neo-republican” works by Philip Pettit (, , and ), Frank
Lovett () and Quentin Skinner (), among others. While my argument
here is highly indebted to these authors, I resist the republican label, since I
reject the notion that there is anything like a sharp distinction between the repub-
lican tradition and a separate liberal one. For other recent (though slightly differ-
ent) arguments to the effect that deliberative democracy secures freedom from
personal power, see Rostbøll  and Gourevitch . It is also important to
distinguish my position from that of Carol C. Gould. According to Gould, par-
ticipatory democracy supports positive freedom as self-development (Gould
). She might be right about this, but my thesis is about the relationship
between deliberative democracy and the absence of personal dependence, not
the presence of the capacity for self-development.
. Rostbøll () is right, I think, to distinguish dimensions of political freedom
from conceptions of political freedom. Different conceptions of freedom are
different ways of analyzing the concept of freedom. As such, they are inherently
competitive. If, for instance, the “republican” conception of freedom as non-dom-
ination is right, the “liberal” conception of freedom as non-interference (e.g.,
Kramer ) is wrong. Different dimensions of freedom, by contrast, are different
ways freedom manifests itself in relation to different moral and social demands, or
under different circumstances. As such, different dimensions of freedom are not
necessarily incompatible with one another; freedom may have, for instance,
both a non-domination dimension and a non-interference dimension.
. Hayek ([] , ) endorses the “time-honored” deﬁnition of freedom as
“the possibility of a person’s acting according to his own decisions and plans, in
contrast with the position of one who was irrevocably subject to the will of
another.” Similarly, Rousseau (, ) writes in the Discourse on Political
Economy: “If someone can compel my will, I am no longer free.”
. For discussion of this example, see Pettit , -.
. Smith ([] , ) writes of the “burghers” who emerged with early capit-
alism and the corresponding demise of feudalism: “The principal attributes of vil-
lanage and slavery being thus taken away from them, they now, at least, became
really free in our present sense of the word Freedom.” For a contemporary devel-
opment of the idea that markets secure independent status, see Taylor .
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. For remarks in this spirit, see Gaus  and Brennan and Lomasky .
. Pettit expresses a similar idea: “The only way in which the state can operate effec-
tively and yet satisfy the demands of republican legitimacy is by giving each of its
citizens an equal share in a system of joint control” (Pettit , ).
. Alex Gourevitch defends a version of this view. See Gourevitch .
. Pettit emphasizes public contestation in his own account of independence-preser-
ving democracy. See Pettit , -.
. G. A. Cohen has effectively pointed out that even if any individual could, at any
time, rise in the socio-economic hierarchy, this does little to ameliorate the moral
character of that hierarchy if any individual’s ascension to a better socio-economic
place is contingent upon others failing to do so. Where the ability to take advan-
tage of an opportunity is thus conditional on others failing to do so, we may say
that people are “collectively unfree”with respect to that opportunity, even if each
individual is free with respect to it. See Cohen , -
. John Tomasi (, -) offers an argument along these lines.
. For a treatment of this literature and some of its implications, see Somin .
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